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PERSUASIVE EFFECTS OF STORY 
AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
E. James Baesler 
Facts and opinions, when offered in 
support of a communicator's claim, consti-
tute the domain of factual evidence {Reinard, 
1988), which can be subdivided into report 
evidence, 1 such as a story narrative, and 
statistical evidence, defined as numerical 
representations of events. 
Cognitive response theory {see Petty, 
Ostrom, & Brock, 1981 for a review) would 
suggest that if an agent attempted to support 
a persuasive claim with evidence, then a 
target would generate cognitive responses 
(CRs) to the message. Petty and Cacioppo 
(1986) found that high quality message 
arguments produce more favorable and 
fewer unfavorable cognitive responses 
{UCRs) than low quality arguments. These 
favorable cognitive responses (FCRs), in 
turn, are positively correlated with persua-
sive outcomes. 
Petty and Cacioppo do not address the 
characteristics of the message arguments that 
may be related to CRs or persuasive out-
comes. Thus, two evidence issues that might 
increase our understanding of persuasion 
remain unaccounted for by current CR 
models: {a) What characteristics distinguish 
1 The story narrative is one common operationaliza-
~on of "repo~ evidence." Ot_her researchers operational-
ize ~eport evidence as case history, exemplar, or opinion 
(Remard, 1988). 
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story from statistical evidence? and (b) 
Which of these discriminating characteristics 
are positively correlated with persuasive 
outcomes? 
INvoL VEMENT, CREDmIUTY, 
AND VIVIDNESS 
Persuasive effects of evidence are moder-
ated by at least three variables not subsumed 
by any one persuasion theory, but nonethe-
less that need to be accounted for when 
attempting to explain effects of evidence. 
First, higher degrees of topic involvement 
facilitate the persuasive effects of evidence 
when compared to low topic involvement 
apparently because of systematic processing 
of central message cues (Stiff, 1986). Second, 
communicator credibility interacts with involve-
ment, such that as involvement increases, the 
effect of credibility on persuasion increases 
to some point beyond which further in-
creases in involvement decrease persuasive-
ness {Stiff, 1986). Third, several studies have 
shown support for the persuasive advantage 
of vivid when compared to nonvivid evidence 
types of evidence {e.g., Kazoleas, 1993; 
Baesler & Burgoon, 1994); other research has 
not revealed support for the vividness hypoth-
esis {e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; see review 
by Taylor & Thompson, 1982). This study 
attempted to control these potentially con-
founding variables by creating messages that 
are comparable on topic involvement, com-
municator credibility, and message vividness. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF STORY 
AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
In a social influence context, given suffi-
cient target motivation {such as an involving 
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message topic), story evidence may be easier 
to argue against than statistical evidence. A 
persuader's use of a story narrative could be 
refuted by the target's recall of a single 
contradictory story. This is not the case for 
arguing against statistical evidence. Typi-
cally, only experts in particular knowledge 
domains would routinely have access to 
statistical data in memory, whereas most 
individuals have a storehouse of stories on 
many topics. Thus, it would be difficult for 
most adults to marshal statistical data to 
counterargue a claim, but story data, since 
they are based on one's personal experience 
or the experience of others that is readily 
accessible, would be the preferred mode of 
arguing against both story and statistical 
claims. 
Other features of evidence that distinguish 
story from statistical evidence, and might 
also be related to persuasiveness, include 
readability, complexity, personalness, and 
scientificness.2 Since the numerical represen-
tation of statistics is encountered less fre-
quently in everyday life than in stories, and 
since statistics are more difficult to interpret 
than a story, statistics are expected to be less 
readable and more complex than stories. 
Personalness and scientificness of evi-
dence were included in this study since they 
are characteristics unique to a particular type 
of evidence. The content and structure of the 
story, with characters engaged in a dialogue, 
are inherently more personal than statistics; 
statistics, by including numerical data based 
on some type of research, are often per-
ceived as inherently more scientific than 
stories. 
Given the review of evidence characteris-
tics and persuasion, the following hypotheses 
and research questions were posed: 
H 1: Story and statistical types of evi-
dence should be persuasive in: (a) changing 
2 It was impractical to manipulate all of these 
variables for both story and statistical types of evidence; 
instead, these exploratory variables were measured 
rather than directly manipulated. 
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beliefs in the direction advocated in a message 
and (b) producing a greater number of 
favorable than unfavorable cognitive responses. 
H2: Statistical evidence, when com-
pared to story evidence, generates: (a) 
greater belief change in the direction advo-
cated by the message and (b) fewer unfavor-
able cognitive responses. 
RQ 1: Are there differences in percep-
tions of the readability, complexity, personal-
ness, and scientificness of story and statistical 
evidence? 
RQ2: Given differences in evidence char-
acteristics, do any of these differences covary 
with persuasion as indicated by belief change 
or cognitive responses? 
METHOD 
Subjects and Procedures 
Participants (N= 100) were undergraduate 
students who participated in the study for 
extra credit. There were no significant 
differences in age (M=22.93) or sex (56% 
female) across experimental conditions. The 
cover story for the investigation asked 
participants to evaluate three different articles 
for possible publication in the campus 
newspaper. Each participant completed the 
following sequence of activities for three 
story or three statistical messages: pre-test of 
beliefs, read article, list CRs, post-test beliefs, 
rate the exploratory variables, and complete 
manipulation checks. 
Design and Independent Variables 
A 2 (evidence) X 3 (message topic) mixed 
design was employed to test the hypotheses 
and answer the research questions. Evidence 
was the fixed factor, and message topic was 
the random (or within subjects) factor in the 
design.3 Evidence was operationalized as 
3 Other scholars, such as Jackson (1992), might 
describe this design as message-by-treatments with 
multiple responses (evidence crossed with message 
replications, and persons nested under evidence but 
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story or statistical, and message topics in-
cluded crime, internships, and birth-control. 
Three variations in the order of messages 
were created, and no significant differences 
in persuasion attributable to order were 
found. 
Evidence and Message Topics. Story and 
statistical evidence were developed on the 
basis of Jackson's (1993) recommendation 
for message instantiation rather than attempt-
ing to manipulate all possible message 
variables that might be related to persuasion. 
Stories were based on the opinion of a single 
individual and contained a scene, characters, 
plot, and resolution. Statistics were based on 
large samples and were presented as percent-
ages and simple odds (e.g., 80%, 4 out of 10). 
Prior research comparing story and statisti-
cal evidence has involved only one message 
topic and topics of low involvement (Baesler 
& Burgoon, 1994; Kazoleas, 1993). Thus, 
three message topics were employed to 
increase the generalizability of potential 
results. The results indicated that all topics 
were perceived to be moderately high in 
involvement (scores on a 1-9 single item 
involvement scale ranged from 7.16-7.62), 
with no significant differences between evi-
dence conditions within a given topic. 
Dependent Measures 
Beliefs and Message Persuasiveness. A mean 
score for two items representing pre- and 
post-beliefs measured agreement with the 
main message argument on 1-9 point Likert-
type scales and had a Cronbach inter-item 
alpha reliability coefficient of .69. 
Cognitive Responses. Two pairs of trained 
coders classified the polarity of CRs into 
favorable, unfavorable, or neutral/irrelevant 
categories (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981). Scott's 
phi inter-coder reliability coefficients were 
.86 and .89 for each pair of coders. Ratings of 
crossed with replications). I have opted for the more 
traditional design language used by Keppel (1982). 
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CRs from both pairs of coders were summed 
for subsequent analysis. 
Exploratory Variables. Single item 1-9 point 
bipolar semantic differential-type scales were 
created to measure the following exploratory 
variables: complexity (simple/complex), 
readability (easy/difficult to read), personal-
ness (personal/impersonal), and scientific-
ness (scientific/unscientific). 
Manipulation Checks for Credibility and 
Vividness 
Credibility. The competence and trustwor-
thiness of the source of the messages (author-
ship of articles was attributed to graduate 
students majoring in journalism) were as-
sessed to confirm that the messages were 
"credible" on two 9-point bipolar semantic 
differential scales and had a Cronbach 
inter-item alpha of . 72. Average credibility 
scores did not differ for story and statistical 
evidence conditions within each of the three 
messages. 
Vividness. All messages were created to be 
moderately vivid by manipulating the linguis-
tic quality of the message. Four 9-point 
bipolar items colorful, concrete, interesting, 
and stimulating' captured degree of vivid-
ness and had an inter-item Cronbach alpha 
reliability coefficient of . 77. Average vivid-
ness scores did not differ between evidence 
conditions within each of the three messages. 
Overall means for vividness ranged between 
5.87 and 6.51, which indicated that all 
messages were perceived to be moderately 
vivid. 
RESULTS 
Independent Persuasive Effects of Evidence 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that both types of 
evidence would be persuasive and was tested 
4 There is a substantial body of literature on vividness 
that supports this particular operationalization (see 
Baesler's review, 1991). 
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TABLE 1 




Topic Pre Post Pre Post 
Crime 4.61a 6.99ac 4.58b 7.44bc 
(1.41) (1.01) (1.09) (1.01) 
Internship 6.56 6.73 6.26 6.35 
(2.08) (2.03) (2.21) (2.38) 
Birth control 3.74d 2.58de 3.76 4.05e 
(2.49) (1.45) (2.34) (2.44) 
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater agreement with 
the position advocated in the message. Within a row, 
common letter subscripts indicate that the respective 
means were significantly different, p < .02, and numbers 
in parentheses are standard deviations. 
in relation to belief change and the ratio of 
favorable to unfavorable CRs. 
Belief Cluznge. Both story and statistical 
evidence were persuasive in cluznging beliefs in 
the direction advocated by the crime topic (a 
modified alpha level of .02 was used to 
account for family wise error rates, Keppel, 
1982), (50)=9.77, (48)= 13.30, p<..02 (See 
Table 1 for means), but not for the internship 
and birth control topics, p> .02. 
Cognitive Responses. Both types of evidence 
produced more favorable tluzn unfavorable CRs 
for the crime, (50)=4.41, (48)=5.22, and 
internship topics, (50)=3.75, (48)=4.04, 
p<..02, but not for the birth-control topic, 
p>.02 (See Table 2 for means). 
Comparative Persuasive Effects of Evidence 
To compare the persuasiveness of story 
versus statistical evidence (H2), two 2 (evi-
dence) X 3 (message topic) repeated mea-
sures analyses of variance were conducted, 
with post beliefs and UCRs as dependent 
measures. Separate ANOV As rather than a 
single MANOVA were employed since the 
underlying metric for the dependent vari-
ables was different. 
Post Beliefs. The most direct test of H2, 
which focused on whether a particular type 








Message Favor- Unfavor- Favor- Unfavor-
Topic able able able able 
Crime 7.30 2.61 8.73 3.22 
(5.45) (3.65) (4.21) (5.00) 
Internship 6.80 3.00 7.34 2.93 
(4.67) (3.64) (5.28) (3.81) 
Birth control 4.05 6.48 3.67 6.97 
(4.20) (5.24) (4.10) (4.69) 
Note: For each type of evidence, all paired contrasts 
between favorable vs unfavorable cognitive responses 
within each topic were statistically significant (p < .02) 
except for story evidence/birth control topic. Numbers 
in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
three message topics, is the main effect for 
evidence. This analysis necessitated the hand 
computation of a quasi-F ratio (F') (See 
Jackson, 1992, p. 76 for the formula) since 
the proper error term and degrees of 
freedom for testing the main effect of 
evidence (see Keppel, 1982, pp. 530-531) 
are not provided in standard repeated 
measures analysis. The F' value was 1.32, 
and comparison with the critical F'l,2 = 
18.5 (the df for F' are hand calculated based 
on mean square ratios, which enables one to 
use a standard Ftable, see Keppel, 1982, p. 
533 for transformation formulae) showed this 
to be nonsignificant. 
In addition, a 2 (evidence) X 3 (message 
topic) analysis of variance on post beliefs was 
conducted to determine if the persuasiveness 
of evidence varied by topic. This yielded a 
significant two-way interaction between evi-
dence and message topic, F(2,196)=4.14, 
p<..05, w2=.01. Overall, neither type of 
evidence demonstrated persuasive superior-
ity across all three messages. 
Unfavorable Cognitive Responses. Hypothesis 
2 predicted that statistical evidence would be 
more difficult to counterargue (and thus 
should generate fewer UCRs) than story 
evidence; however, the results indicated that 
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TABLE 3 
MEANS PERSONAL AND SCIENTIFlC CHARACTERISTICS 
OF EVIDENCE-EVIDENCE BY MESSAGE TOPIC 
Characteristics of Evidence 
Personal Scientific 
Message 
Topic Story Statistic Story Statistic 
Crime 7.13 5.06 3.41 4.89 
(2.19) (2.45) (2.33) (2.07) 
Internship 6.96 5.36 3.45 5.26 
(1.95) (2.27) (2.04) (2.00) 
Birth control 7.62 5.67 5.25 5.87 
(1.38) (2.35) (2.58) (2.27) 
Note: Higher numbers indicate greater amounts of the 
evidence characteristic. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard deviations. All paired contrasts of evidence 
within each topic were statistically significant except 
scientificness of evidence for the birth control topic. 
there were no differences in the number of 
UCRs generated by either type of evidence. 
Exploratory Variables. Research question 1 
focused on whether several variables might 
differentiate story from statistical evidence. 
These analyses required the calculation of a 
quasi-F ratio according to the same proce-
dures outlined under results for post-beliefs. 
The personalness of stories was rated high in 
comparison to the moderate ratings of 
personalness for statistics for all three mes-
sage topics, F'=22.37, p<..05, w2=.15, criti-
cal F(I,28)=4.20 {See Table 3 for means). In 
contrast, the sdentificness of statistics was rated 
moderate in comparison to lower ratings of 
scientificness for story evidence across all 
three message topics, F'=6.29, p<..05, 
w2 =.06, critical F(I,6)=5.99 (Refer to Table 
3 for means). No patterns of statistical 
significance emerged in the evidence con-
trasts within each message topic for readabil-
ity and complexity. 
Research question 2 asked whether the 
exploratory variables that reliably distin-
guish story from statistical types of evidence 
would also predict persuasive effects related 
to beliefs or CRs. For each of the three 
message topics,._ Pearson product moment 
correlations indicated that the evidence 
characteristics of scientificness and personal-
SPRING 1997 
ness were not reliably related to the persua-
sive outcome measures ( rs ranged between 
-.04 and .10,p>.05). 
DISCUSSION 
Story and statistical evidence were persua-
sive in: ( 1) changing beliefs (pre to post test) 
related to the crime topic, and (2) generating 
more favorable than unfavorable CRs for the 
crime and internship topics {HI). Statistical 
evidence was no more persuasive than story 
evidence when measures of beliefs and 
UCRs were employed as outcome measures 
(H2). Statistical evidence was rated as more 
scientific and less personal than story evi-
dence (RQI); however, neither of these 
variables covaried with persuasion (RQ2). 
In comparison to prior research, which 
has shown a persuasive advantage for statisti-
cal over story evidence when employing a 
low involvement topic (Baesler & Burgoon, 
1994), the test of the main effect for evidence 
in this study suggested that statistical evi-
dence is neither more nor less persuasive 
than story evidence for topics of moderately 
high involvement. This finding, when coupled 
with the results that indicated both types of 
evidence generated comparable levels of 
UCRs, does not lend support to the counter-
argument hypothesis. It appears that simple 
statistics (percentages and odds) are no more 
difficult to counterargue than story narra-
tives. It remains for future research to 
determine whether there are any differences 
in the quality of arguments used to discount 
statistical versus story evidence in contexts 
suited to interactive communication, such as 
interpersonal compliance-gaining. 
The significant two-way interaction be-
tween evidence and message topic indicated 
that persuasive effects of evidence varied by 
topic. This finding could be interpreted in a 
number of ways. The process of ruling out 
some interpretations in favor of others is akin 
to Popper's (1961) notion that theoretical 
explanations are like a fishing net whose 
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mesh we endeavor to make finer and finer. 
For the net used to catch the message-
evidence interaction some interpretations 
are more plausible than others given the 
control and exploratory variables (the mesh 
of the net) built into the design of the study. 
That is, the message-evidence interaction is 
not attributable to the variables of credibility, 
involvement, vividness, scientificness, person-
alness, readability, or complexity. 
Since message topic was a random factor 
in the design, there are a multitude of other 
moderating variables that might explain the 
message-evidence interaction. While specula-
tive, one possible explanation might be 
related to initial beliefs. Differences in the 
persuasiveness of evidence by message topic 
may be associated with differences in initial 
beliefs among the three messages (unfavor-
able for birth control, neutral for crime, and 
favorable for internships). It would be prema-
ture, however, to conclude that initial beliefs 
are the moderating variable for the message-
evidence interaction since there are no 
replications of messages based on type of 
initial belief. Future research might include 
message replications for initial belief in order 
to explore this hypothesis further. 
The exploratory research questions were 
designed to uncover other message variables 
that might (a) distinguish story from statisti-
cal evidence and (b) predict persuasiveness. 
Perceptions of evidence's personalness and 
scientificness reliably distinguished between 
stories and statistics, but were not related to 
persuasiveness. Future research might experi-
mentally vary the personal and scientific 
features of story and statistical evidence to 
provide a better representation of the band-
width of these variables before discounting 
their potential persuasive impact. 
Future research might also investigate the 
effects of story and statistical evidence 
independently of each other since complex 
studies like this one only allow for a limited 
number of experimental manipulations. Two 
potentially fruitful studies are apparent. One 
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investigation might explore statistical fea-
tures of evidence, such as sample size, 
numerical presentation (e.g., confidence inter-
val, percent, odds), and sampling method, 
under conditions of high and low involve-
ment. Second, the story features of evidence, 
could be experimentally varied and tested 
for their persuasive effects using an instru-
ment that assesses story coherence and 
fidelity (Baesler, 1995) on the basis of Fisher's 
(1989) narrative theory. 
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